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RECENT BOOKS
A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES. By John P. Dawson. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1960. Pp. x, 310. $6.50.
Research and writing in English legal history has tended to concentrate
on the common law, i.e., on the law that developed in the royal courts at
Westxninster. This is natural enough, for out of the activities of those
courts evolved our present legal system and substantive law. Moreover,
they were "professional" courts and their activities are fairly easily reducible to patterns meaningful and interesting to researcher and reader
alike. But this concentration of scholarly effort has led to distortions in
our understanding of the earlier judicial system of England. An example
is a widespread failure to appreciate the substantial importance of the
local courts in the total adxninistration of English justice. More specifically, erudite inquiry into the technical process by which debt and
assumpsit, among other royal writs, led eventually to a systematic common
law of contracts has tended to conceal the considerable extent to which
informal contracts were enforced by the local courts, by the canon law,
and to some extent by the chancery, long before the common law courts
had managed to extend assumpsit to cover this field.
A failure to give due weight to the local courts in investigating the
judicial system of earlier centuries has also led to a failure to appreciate
fully how long these courts lasted as working, effective courts. The
central courts were victorious quite early in the competition for jurisdiction with other court systems, but this does not mean that they excluded
the other systems altogether. Rather they subjected them to control, appropriated from them the more desirable classes of business, and, having
reduced them to a position where they no longer challenged the primacy
of the central courts, left them to handle, essentially unhindered, a substantial amount of small claims and other legal business. 1 The long
duration and considerable importance of the local courts is underscored
by the 1846 purchase by the town council of Manchester of the lordship
rights to the Manor of Manchester from Sir Oswald Moseley, for the sum
of 200,000 pounds. Thereafter the manor court, exceedingly active until
then, was permitted to disappear. 2 Even more recently, in 1948, the homage
jury of the manor of Fulham, formerly embracing the whole of Fulham
and Hammersxnith, now a wilderness of brick and asphalt in the west end
1 Professor Dawson tells a similar story for the French legal system. As late as the
eve of the revolution there may have been as many as 70,000 to 80,000 judges in all
the seignorial courts of France (p. 79) • "The truth seems to be that the seignorial
courts had acquired not so much a corps of judges as an army of predators" (p. 80) •
2 Pp. 253-54, relying on "WEBB 8: WEBB, ENGUSH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FROM THE
REvoLUTION TO THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Am: (1906) • Of course it is true that such
long duration at such a high level of activity was not common.
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of London, finally ceased to exist and disposed of its remaining assets.a
Recent researches have thrown some light on the extent to which the law
of certain manorial courts, still active and important in the seventeenth
century, influenced markedly the development of the law of Massachusetts.
They did so because they were more familiar to the Puritan migrants from
the outlying counties of England than were the central courts far away
in Westminster. 4
It is the great merit of Professor Dawson's very learned book to correct
some of these misconceptions and to help give balance to our thinking
about some aspects of the history of English law. In describing the
participation of laymen in the administration of English justice, he makes
it clear to us how important were the various local courts in the overall administration of justice. The failure of most writers to deal adequately
with this subject has not resulted from a lack of material. As the author
remarks: "In trying to discover the stage that the manorial courts had
reached by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one soon discovers the
main problem to be an oversupply of information" (p. 208) . The best
one can do, and what Professor Dawson does particularly well, is to
engage in limited explorations of part of the data, generalizing cautiously
and giving a factual basis for some new hypotheses to be tested in further
research. He has looked in some detail at parts of the papers of the Redgrave Manor in Suffolk, which was owned first by the Bacon family and
then by Lord Chief Justice Holt and his descendants (pp. 208-55) . This
part of the study is the most original, and in my opinion the most
interesting.
These contributions alone would make Professor Dawson's book a
valuable addition to the literature of English legal history. But the book
does more. The author brings his remarkable knowledge of comparative
legal history to bear on the history of the lay courts which occupied such
an important place in English legal history. He finds that the comparable
courts in France were far more extensively professionalized than in England. The £actual description of the development of French (as well as
German) judicial institutions is highly illuminating to the novice in
these matters. And when he goes beyond mere description to seek explanations for the great divergence in the evolution of these neighboring
legal systems that once had so much in common, the writing becomes
exceptionally fruitful. He suggests that the immediate cause of the diverLondon Times, Jan. 3, 1948. No doubt there are many more such examples.
See, e.g., HAsKINs, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MAssACHUSE'ITS 163-80 (1960);
Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 CoLuM.
L. REV. 416 (1931); Haskins, A Problem in the Reception of the Common Law in the
Colonial Period, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 842 (1949); Haskins, The Beginnings of the Recording System in Massachusetts, 21 B.U.L. REv. 281 (1941).
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gence was the adoption in France, but not in England, of the Romancanonist procedure, involving proof by individual witnesses given under
oath. According to the author, this rational and modem system of
procedure was a voracious maw which devoured trained and experienced
personnel in ever increasing numbers to shuffle the mountains of paper that
appeared in the course of natural evolution. On the other hand, the
English system, far less rational and refined, made maximum use of lay
personnel. It called upon a group of citizens of the vicinage to decide
fact questions, relieving the trained justice of the task. It developed
pleading techniques that reduced the legal issues within a narrow framework and thus lessened the work of the justices. Finally, its appellate
procedure concentrated on the correction of formal errors on the record,
rather than the correction of substantial errors through a reconsideration
of the case. Through all these labor-saving devices, the English system
could operate with but a handful of professionals, by comparison with
the French system. In France, in the early decades of the eighteenth
century, the number of royal judges must have exceeded 5,000, while
in England during the whole period from 1300 A.D. to 1800 A.D. the
judges of the central courts of common law and of Chancery seldom
exceeded fifteen, so effectively had the English Government made use of
lay and local personnel in the administration of justice (p.71).
Although this thesis is provocative, it is hard to concede so much effect
to the mere adoption of the Roman-canonist system of procedure. It,
like the jury system that was the other main available alternative, does
not exist in a single unalterable form. There are many possible variations
on either system and the variations would change the pressures of the
system with respect to the professionalization of the judiciary. More
fundamental factors and forces in society must have accounted for the
fact that the particular variation of the Roman-canonist system of procedure that developed in France was so insatiable of professional lawmen,
or, perhaps more appropriately, that the jury system in England operated
with such an astonishingly limited use of professionals. Professor Dawson
recognizes the existence of these more basic forces, pointing to the early
centralization of power in the English crown, and the early determination
of the vigorous Anglo-Norman kings to govern intensively and pervasively
and with a firm hand, as decisive causes of the extensive use of laymen in
the judicial process. Few professionals existed and in the earlier centuries
there was little prospect of preparing more. The unpaid amateur must
be dragooned into service to get the job done. "Beginning so early and
attempting so much, their only recourse was to delegate" (p. 295). It
may be, as Professor Dawson suggests, that this indeed led to a choice
of jury trial instead of the Roman-canonist trial procedure. Where his
explanation seems a little too pat is in suggesting that the choice, once
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made, was essentially irrevocable (p. 87) , that the system, once started on
its way, was "further refined and elaborated under the pressure of its own
internal logic" (p. 68). With all respect, this seems an overdramatization
and oversimplification of the causal factors. To the extent that it is true,
it seems a mere statement of the importance of inertia as a factor in legal
growth. Beyond that, it is hard to believe that there is much of an "internal
logic" of any system of procedure. The Roman-canonist system, once
selected, could surely have evolved in a variety of directions, the choice
among which must have been made because of forces in society rather
than because of any assumed inherent seminal difference between witness
proof and trial by jury. The immense variability of a procedural system is
illustrated, if illustration is necessary, by Professor Dawson's description
of the procedure in the Court of Chancery, where he takes a view of
this evolution different from the traditional one. This section is, in
itself, a fruitful and provocative essay challenging Langdell's classic interpretation of chancery procedure as an adaptation of the canonist
system (pp. 145-72).
Moreover, the use of the jury has changed its meaning fundamentally
since it began its course. In the beginning it "clearly was not, as we consider the jury now to be, a major protection against oppression by government; it was, on the contrary, an oppressive exercise of the highest powers
of government" (p. I 19). This point, repeatedly emphasized by Professor
Dawson, seems to come closer to explaining the difference between French
and English development than the mere selection of a procedural form.
English kings were strong in a period when, in order to be strong, it
was necessary to encourage and make use of local institutions. When
French kings became strong, the local institutions had passed into private
hands, because of the earlier weakness of the royal authority, thus creating
entirely different pressures for the further evolution of the legal system.
It is not that the selection of a procedure is unimportant, but that it is
much less decisive than Professor Dawson would make it. On the other
hand, Professo_r Dawson's underlining of the choice of a procedural system
has the great merit of stating emphatically the lawyer's perception of the
crucial importance of procedure to a society, a point all too little understood by those who have not had legal training, whether they be professional historians or not.
If there is any other weakness in the book, and I suggest both with
great diffidence, it is in Professor Dawson's fascination with paradoxes.
There is something intriguing about stating a paradox, but perhaps the
temptation should sometimes be resisted. The main paradox he states
in more than a single form, one of which we have already seen. It relates
to the central theme discussed above. "And so we face the paradox, that
the great power of the English monarchy, mobilized so early, produced in
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the end self-government" (p. 295) . "The canonist methods of proof were
soon to require a vast increase in the royal bureaucracy and the criminal
inquisition came later to symbolize the overriding power of unlimited
monarchy, but the initial choice of this procedure by the central government may well have been due much more to weakness than to strength"
(p. 48) • Nor are these central paradoxes all he finds. "The land that had
exported the jury abolished it at home" (p. 122) . "Perhaps this is another
paradox, that the English respect for law is still partly due to the important share that laymen still have in administering it" (p. 145) . The fault,
if fault it be, is the fondness for dramatic overgeneralization that the liking
for paradoxes betrays.
To point to these as the book's worst (though very minor) faults is
merely another way of saying that this is an exceedingly important study,
with interesting and fruitful hypotheses about the causal forces operative
in legal change. This is a book to be read and reread, to be reflected upon
and reconsidered. This review has pointed out only a tithe of the book's
contributions to our thinking about our past. It may well become one of
the classics of English and comparative legal history and should certainly
become well known to everyone with any interest in that neglected subject.
Spencer L. Kimball,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan

